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I. INTRODUCTION
For the last twenty-five years Lloyd Reynolds has displayed a 
keen interest in analyzing the economic behavior of the government 
sector from a comparative point of view. This is reflected not on y 
in some of his articles (e.g., Reynolds 1971) but also ^ his aid to 
younger economists at Yale who were working on such problems. In 
particular, Lloyd Reynolds greatly encouraged and assisted basic 
research on differences in the public sectors in East and West I
carried out at the Yale Growth Center. This essay represents an 
attempt to reanalyze some of this early work, taking into account 
fourtLn years of further developments of the nations under
examination^^^^^ of "public sector" refers to three major phenomena: 
public ownership of the means of production, public participation 
(directly or indirectly) in production decisions, and public financing S good^ services, and transfer payments through taxes and loans^ 
And "public" itself can refer to various levels of government, to 
"social" authorities, or other groups such as nonprofit units
charitable foundations. .Although a study of the changing role of the public ^®‘'bor in
countries with different economic systems can thus ® “
range of economic events, a researcher faces two _Firft, certain topics cannot be easily studied because of the Pau^ity 
of readily available and comparable data; for instance, it would be 
extremely difficult to study differences in 
in production decision making in many countries. 
topics do not seem fruitful to study; for instance, the 
Ea^ern Europe are primarily nationalized, with the ,
agricultural and petty trade and service sectors, so that trends i 
nfrionalization primarily reflect changes in sectoral composition of 
output, rather than any dramatic change in policy.
I have chosen to focus this essay on changes in public 
consumption expenditures, particularly related to
and social welfare, in Eastern and Western Europe. ^
extremely important, for the single most dramatic change in the P^bli 
sector in the West in the last twenty years has been
public expenditures. For instance, the average share of total public
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consumption expenditures in the GNP of the OECD nations has risen from 
28.5 percent in 1955-57 to 34.5 percent in 1967-69 to 41.4 percent in 
1975-76, and further increases are anticipated (OECD 1978, 20-21). 
Leading this trend has been the rise in "welfare state expenditures," 
that is, expenditures for education, health, and social welfare (which 
includes income maintenance and pensions).
The purpose of this essay is to present some quantitative 
evidence on public expenditures to allow us to explore a number of 
hypotheses about the causes of this dramatic increase in the public 
sector, both traditional approaches from the demand side and more 
recent ideas focusing on political factors and other "supply side" 
considerations. By contrasting the experience of nations with 
different economic systems, we can also attempt to isolate the 
systemic factors underlying public expenditures. The major 
conclusions of this exercise are three: demand factors seem 
considerably more important than supply factors in explaining this 
increase in public expenditures; such expenditures appear to have 
grown more rapidly as a share of GNP in the market than the centrally 
administered economies; and in the future, such public expenditures 
may constitute a significantly higher share of total expenditures in 
the market than in the centrally administered economies.
Before turning to the analysis, it must be emphasized that 
comparative examination of public expenditures data raises some 
important statistical problems which can only be handled by 
circumventing them. One serious difficulty concerns the meaning of 
public investments, for the government can participate in the 
investment process in a variety of ways which may have the same end 
result but which utilize different institutional mechanisms. In the 
United States in 1975, for instance, direct investments by all levels 
of government amounted to roughly 24 percent of total gross 
investment.^ However, governmental agencies on the federal level also 
lent out funds amounting to about 26 percent of total gross investment 
and guaranteed a group of loans that amounted to 13 percent of total 
gross investment. Since the degree to which these loans were used for 
Investment purposes is quite unclear, all we can say is that 
government involvement in capital formation was somewhere between 24 
percent and 64 percent of total gross investment. Inclusion of loans 
and guarantees by state and local governments would raise the upper 
limit and our uncertainty becomes greater. This problem is avoided by 
focusing only on current expenditures.
Another difficulty concerns government participation in such 
fields as housing, where government action having the same end effect 
can take place through direct Investment in housing, subsidies for 
interest or construction costs or maintenance costs, or various types 
of income or rent subsidies to renters. This problem is avoided by 
omitting consideration of housing.
Still another difficulty concerns transfer payments, which can be 
either in money or in kind; the latter are extremely difficult to 
separate from government expenditures on goods and services (e.g., 
education). It might also be argued that transfer payments must also 
include those given by quasi-public bodies such as pension funds, an 
issue that leads us to considerations of "pension fund socialism" 
discussed by economists such as Drucker (1976) and which gives rise to 
enormous problems in finding comparable data. These problems are
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avoided by combining current expenditures and transfer payments and by 
focusing only upon direct agencies of government at various levels.
For these and other reasons, I have chosen to focus on public 
consumption expenditures (i.e., current expenditures for goods and 
services plus transfers) in seven specified areas which are made by 
various levels of government. Of course, delineation of "current 
expenditures" raises a number of conceptual problems which cannot be 
touched upon here. A number of specific statistical problems 
concerning the expenditures and the GNP data are discussed in the 
following section, a necessary but unpleasant prelude to the 
presentation of the data and their interpretation.
II. THE DATA
A. Sample Selection
This essay represents an extension of a previous study by the 
author (Pryor 1968) that analyzed public consumption expenditures in 
seven market, and seven centrally administered economies. The 
countries originally selected were matched roughly for per capita GNP 
in 1956. Although such levels have diverged considerably, they are 
sufficiently close so that the sample can still be used. Other 
problems arise because in one case (Hungary) a centrally administered 
economy has tried since 1969 to introduce a guided market economyj 
nevertheless, this nation has had central administration of sufficient 
magnitude, and a price structure sufficiently distorted by 
differential subsidies and taxes requiring the employment of many 
nonmarket allocative devices, so that it must be considered as 
representing some type of hybrid economic system leaning toward a
centrally administered system. Furthermore, in a number of the market 
economies in the sample, governmental dirigisme of production has
increased, so they have moved somewhat closer to central 
administration of production; nevertheless, their economic systems
have sufficient market elements so that they may be considered as 
representing some type of hybrid economic system leaning toward a
market economy. In short, the two groups of economies still diverge 
to such a degree that we need not abandon the sample and select other 
nations. The countries under consideration and certain basic 
information about them are presented in Table 1.
B. Estimation Procedures
Public consumption expenditures, on which this analysis focuses, 
are current governmental expenditures plus transfers that are financed 
either by taxes or by governmental borrowing. Expenditures for 
military equipment are considered as a current expenditure. Although 
primary attention is placed on governmental budgetary expenditures, 
important extrabudgetary expenditures financed through taxlike 
payments are also included.
Given problems of obtaining comparable data for the fourteen 
countries, this analysis has focused on seven functions financed 
through public consumption expenditures for which estimates could be 
made. These adjusted budgetary expenditures include: general 
administration, internal security (police and justice), external
TABLE 1
The Sample of Nations In 1970 
Market Economies
GNP per
capita
Indices
Population
In
thousands
ABE/GNP 
In
percent
U.S.A. 100.0 204,880 27
West Germany 78.2 60,710 28
Austria 54.2 7,430 33
Italy 49.2 53,660 28
Ireland 45.1 2,950 24
Greece 38.5 8,790 24
Yugoslavia 25.8 20,370 28
Centrally Administered Economies
GNP per
capita
Indices
Population
In
thousands
ABE/HNP
In
percent
East Germany 63.9 17,060 32
Czechoslovakia 62.0 14,330 26
U.S.S.R. 46.9 242,760 27
Hungary 42.7 10,340 18
Bulgaria 37.3 8,490 20
Poland 35.4 32,530 23
Romania 31.2 20,250 17
Note: ABE/GDP = adjusted budgetary expenditures / gross domestic product.
Sources: GNP per capita data from Pryor (1979) and Kravis, Heston and Summers (1978).
Population data from United Nations (1977).
Sources and calculation of the ABE/GDP data are described In the text.
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security (military, diplomacy, and foreign aid), education, health, 
social welfare (pensions plus general social expenditures), and 
research and development. The exact definitions are described in the 
book cited above (Pryor 1968).
Adjusting the data from the various nations so that they are 
comparable is a wearisome task. It took me roughly two years of full­
time research to make the data for the various nations compatible for 
the 1950-62 period that is covered in the book. I did not have the 
luxury of such time to extend these data to 1976; therefore, I was 
forced to use a number of shortcut methods that reduced the period of 
research but, at the same time, reduced the accuracy of the estimates. 
However, by focusing upon welfare state expenditures -- expenditures 
on education, health, and social welfare -- I have selected that 
subset of expenditure estimates on which I place the most confidence. 
The data came from a wide variety of national and international 
sources of data (which may be obtained from the author), and they 
certainly reflect the most important trends, even if certain details 
may be questioned. In making the estimates, some corrections were 
made to the data for 1962 to reflect more recent information; no 
corrections were made to 1956 data.* The result of these efforts is 
that for this study we have twenty-year series (from 1956 through 
1976) of adjusted budgetary expenditures for fourteen nations in 
Eastern and Western Europe and North America.
The very difficult task of separating transfers from current 
expenditures could not be carried out; therefore we have no valid 
method of calculating fixed-price series. Since we are left with 
current-price series, some method must be devised to abstract from the 
Impact of gross changes in prices. The most usual procedure found in 
the literature is to express these data in terms of a percentage of 
GDP. However, such a procedure raises a serious problem for the 
countries under consideration which deserves brief discussion, for 
some interpretive difficulties are involved.
For the market economies, it seemed appropriate to compute the 
ratio of public consumption expenditures to the GDP at factor costs, 
that is, the GDP at market costs minus net indirect business taxes 
(indirect business taxes minus subsidies). For the centrally 
administered economies, GNP data according to Western definitions are 
available for all countries; and GNP minus net indirect business taxes 
can be calculated. Since the difference between GDP and GNP for these 
nations is minimal, this is not a problem. However, the meaning of 
GNP at factor prices raises some questions, for there is no market for 
capital or land and the factor costs attributable to them in the GNP 
at factor prices do not necessarily reflect their marginal 
productivity as they roughly do in market economies.
Ideally, we should estimate the marginal productivity of these 
two factors of production, then revalue all goods and services 
according to their factor costs and costs of inputs at these new 
prices, and finally calculate the ratio of public consumption 
expenditures to the GNP using these adjusted prices. This task would, 
for the seven countries involved, take many years, and we must adopt 
some shortcut techniques. But it should be noted that whatever 
technique is involved, the results are strongly affected. In Table 2 
I present ratios of adjusted budgetary expenditures and also of 
welfare state expenditures (i.e., education, health, and social
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welfare) to the GNP in prices at which the goods and services are sold 
ot transferred (established prices), GNP minus net indirect business 
taxes, and GNP minus net indirect business taxes and also minus profit 
taxes. The results show quite clearly that the value of the ratio 
depends critically on which concept of GNP is chosen.
For the centrally administered economies for the rest of this 
study I have chosen as the denominator of the expenditures/production 
ratio the GNP minus.net indirect business taxes (the same solution 
adopted in my previous study). This should not greatly affect the 
trend data; however, those dubious of this procedure should be careful 
in comparing relative levels of public consumption expenditures among 
nations.
C. The Results
The results of these calculations are presented in Tables 3 and 
4. Between 1956 and 1976, adjusted budgetary expenditures increased 
dramatically in all market economies; in contrast, in the centrally 
administered economies, these increases were relatively small or, in 
the cases of the Soviet Union and Romania, decreases were registered. 
(In the former country, so many difficulties were encountered in 
estimating external security expenditures that this may be a 
statistical artifact.) Turning to welfare state expenditures, we see 
that they account for most of the dramatic increases in the market 
economies and, in addition, show an increase (sometimes considerable) 
in all centrally administered economies except Romania.
From Table 4 we see that in most countries a major share of the 
increase in welfare state expenditures came from increases in social 
welfare expenditures. It should be noted that a major share of these 
social welfare expenditures -- about 75 percent or more -- go for 
pensions and other payments to the elderly.
The tables contain some interesting information about the 
differential timing of these changes. For instance, in most 
countries, the major changes in welfare state expenditures came after 
1962; and in many centrally administered economies, these payments 
rose especially after 1970. It is upon these data that the 
statistical experiments described below are performed to reveal other 
facets of this rising importance of the public sector.
III. INTERPRETATIONS
In early studies of the determinants of public expenditures, 
primary attention was paid to the demand forces underlying the level 
and change of these expenditures. Somewhat later, supply side 
considerations began to be considered. Recently we are beginning to 
see attempts to apply both demand and supply models. The data 
presented in the previous section are considered in the light of all 
three approaches.
A. Demand Approaches
Some statistical considerations. For at least a half a century 
simple demand approaches toward the determinants of public 
expenditures have been used. A typical equation using just such an 
approach is:
TABLE 2
The Impact of Various Methods 
(Percent)
of Valuation of the GNP on the Expenditures/GNP Ratio in 1970
Adjusted Budgetary Expenditures/GNP Welfare State Expenditures/GNP
Valuation Method: A B C A B C
East Germany 38 32 30 23 20 18
Czechoslovakia 34 26 24 24 19 18
U.S.S.R. 32 27 23 17 14 12
Hungary 22 18 16 13 11 10
Bulgaria 24 20 18 16 14 12
Poland 27 23 19 17 15 12
Romania 19 17 15 13 12 10
Notes: Method A » GNP in established prices (prices at which goods and services are sold or trans­
ferred) minus net indirect business taxes (indirect business taxes minus subsidies) minus 
business profits taxes.
Ifethod B = GNP in established prices minus net Indirect business taxes.
Method C = GNP in established prices.
Sources: These calculations were made from the public consumption expenditures data described in
the text and from GNP data presented in Thad P. Alton, et al. (1973). The Alton esti­
mates were supplemented with data from national sources and, for the USSR, from other 
Western recalculations of the Soviet GNP.
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TABLE 3
Trends in Public Consumption Expenditures and Welfare State Expenditures, 1956-1976 
(Percent of Gross Production)
Adjusted Budget Expenditures Welfare State Expenditures
1956 1962 1970 1976 1956 1962 1970 1976
Market economies
U.S.A. 20 23 26 27 8 11 14 19
West Germany 25 29 28 38 18 19 20 29
Austria 25 28 31 35 21 23 26 30
Italy 24 25 28 33 15 17 21 16
Ireland 21 18 24 34 16 14 18 26
Greece 17 18 24 24 8 10 14 13
Yugoslavia 27 28 28 30 13 16 18 19
Centrally administered economies
East Germany 33 30 32 36 19 20 20 22
Czechoslovakia 31 27 26 33 20 18 19 24
U.S.S.R. 30 30 27 28 14 14 14 16
Hungary 23 19 18 28 11 12 11 20
Bulgaria 28 21 20 25 14 12 14 17
Poland 21 20 23 21 12 12 15 14
Romania 20 18 17 13 10 12 12 9
Notes: The calculation of this table is described in the text. For Hungary, data are for 1955.
Sources: The 1956 data are from Pryor (1968).
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TABLE 4
Education, Health, and Welfare Data 
(Percent)
Expenditures as a Percent 
Production
of Gross
Population 
65 and over 
as Percent of 
Population 
15 through 64Education Health Welfare
1956 1976 1956 1976 1956 1976 1956 1976
Market economies
U.S.A. 2.4 5.0 0.9 2.9 4.8 11.3 14.5 16.4
West Germany 2.2 3.8 2.6 5.1 13.1 20.6 14.8 22.9
Austria 2.5 4.6 2.8 4.6 15.5 21.1 17.1 24.4
Italy 2.7 5.0 3.0 6.1 9.8 14.8 13.2 17.6
Ireland 2.6 5.8 3.8 7.4 10.0 13.3 18.3 18.8
Greece 1.3 2.0 1.0 1.4 5.3 9.3 11.5 19.5
Yugoslavia 2.1 4.8 3.2 4.5 7.5 10.0 9.6 13.3
Centrally Administered Economies
East Germany 3.8 4.9 4.4 5.1 10.7 11.7 19.7 26.0
Czechoslovakia 3.8 3.9 4.2 3.8 11.9 16.3 12.7 18.8
U.S.S.R. 4.4 3.7 3.0 2.6 6.4 9.3 8.9 12.4
Hungary 2.7 3.4 2.6 5.3 5.6 11.6 12.7 19.3
Bulgaria 5.1 3.9 3.4 3.1 5.5 10.3 10.9 16.2
Poland 2.6 3.2 2.6 3.3 6.5 7.1 8.7 14.7
Romania 3.4 2.5 2.7 1.9 3.8 5.0 9.6 15.1
Notes: The calculation of the expenditure ratios for 1976 is described 
in the text. For Hungary, data are for 1955 Instead of 1956. 
Population data for West Germany In 1956 omit West Berlin. 
Population data for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia 
are for 1975 Instead of 1976. Population data for the USSR 
are for 1974 instead of 1976; the age distribution for the 
USSR mas, in part, estimated.
Sources: The 1956 expenditures data are from Pryor (1968). Population 
data for all market economies except Yugoslavia are from 
OECD (periodic); data for all other countries are from 
United Nations (I960 and 1977).
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= a + bX^
where G is government expenditures as a percentage of GNP, X is a 
vector of causal variables related to the demand for public 
expenditures, b is a vector of coefficients, a is a constant term, and 
t is the time subscript. One causal variable receiving a great deal 
of early attention is per capita income, an hypothesis called 
"Wagner's Law" (Timm 1961), but discussed much earlier by other 
economists such as Adam Smith and J. S. Mill. A large number of other 
economic causal variables that are somehow related to the demand for 
these services have also been proposed, for example, the degree of 
urbanization, the density of the area, the size of the governmental 
unit, and various demographic variables. More recently, social 
scientists from other disciplines have attempted to add political 
variables (reviewed in Pryor 1968) or sociological variables (Wilensky 
1975); the latter seem more promising than the former. Sometimes the 
demand for public expenditures is related to certain variables in 
isolation from what is happening in the rest of the economy; sometimes 
the demand for public expenditures is tied to the demand for private 
expenditures and the degree to which the private sector is able to 
provide services either as complements to, or a substitute for, 
services provided through the public sector.
In recent years this type of specificiation has been considerably 
modified. Some analysts have assumed that the basic causal variables 
influence desired, not actual, government expenditures and that there 
is lagged response of actual to desired expenditures (so that an 
additional explanatory variable representing government expenditures 
in the previous period is added to the above equation). Other 
complications in the form of various types of Interactions can be 
introduced. For instance, we can model a mutual causation between 
certain response coefficients (b in the equation) and governmental 
expenditures or we can make some of the response coefficients 
functions of still other independent variables (e.g., when the growth 
rate of the economy influences the response to per capita income), so 
that some interaction terms must be added to the above equation. 
Unfortunately, the sample used for analysis in this study is too small 
to permit these various modifications of the simple demand equation to 
be introduced successfully.
Two very serious interpretative problems of the regression 
analysis based on the demand approach must also be mentioned: these 
relate to problems of multicollinearity and confusion between cross- 
sectional and time-series results.
In many of the studies using the demand approach there is 
considerable multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. One 
example occurs because per capita income and the relative price of 
government expenditures, both important demand elements, rise together 
and in a number of studies both are included as independent variables. 
The interpretations given to the resulting regression coefficients 
(and their standard errors) are open to considerable doubt since the 
results are so highly sensitive to those cases where one of the two 
variables does not predict well the other variable. In such a case, 
if the price variable is dropped, the calculated response coefficient 
of government expenditures to per capita income includes price effects 
as well.
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In recent years perhaps the most serious interpretative problem 
in applying the demand approach has been a confusion of cross~ 
sectional and time-series elasticities of government expenditures. 
For instance, both T. E. Borcherding (1977, ch. 3) and Sam Peltzman 
(1980) have argued that since the income elasticity of public 
expenditures is unity or less, the dramatic rise in public 
expenditures can not be due to demand factors. However, these demand 
elasticities are drawn from cross-sectional regressions of U.S. states 
and local governments, and then they are applied to time-series data 
where they do not apply. Several examples can demonstrate this point 
more concretely.
Among the OECD nations in recent years, the fastest growing part 
of public expenditures is, in most cases, transfer payments and these 
are primarily payments to the elderly which are included under my 
definition of social welfare expenditures. As one can see from the 
data in Table 4, for the sample nations, at any given point in time 
there seems to be only a weak relationship between per capita income 
of a country and the relative importance of retired people; but over 
time as per capita income has increased, the share of the elderly has 
increased dramatically. Further, as I discuss below, social welfare 
expenditures as a share of GNP are related to how long the social 
insurance system has been in operation, which is not strongly related 
to per capita income. So we have very important reasons to expect 
that the elasticity derived from time-series data for social welfare 
expenditures should be much greater than the elasticity derived from 
cross-sectional data.
Another example concerns education expenditures. At any single 
point in time, a certain level of education in the population is 
needed to utilize the most modern technology. Comparing two points in 
time for a nation with a constant per capita income, the same nation 
at the later time will require more educated people because the 
general level of world technology rises. Thus for education the time- 
series income elasticity should be higher than the cross-sectional 
income elasticity.
A final example refers to the situation where the cross-sectional 
elasticities are derived from governmental subunits within a nation, 
and the time series elasticities refer to total governmental 
expenditures. This is an incorrect procedure since we are comparing 
two different series of governmental expenditures (the time series 
includes federal governmental expenditures while the cross section 
does not). Further, on a state and local level there is a strong 
demonstration effect, for example, the state of Mississippi, which is 
]~0^^^ively poor, may have governmental education expenditures per 
student that are almost the same as those in a much richer state such 
as New York, since the students from the former state must later 
compete against students from the latter state in the national labor 
market. Since state and local governments make certain decisions 
about their expenditures on the basis of what other states are 
spending, the cross-sectional income elasticities of public 
expenditures may be quite low vis-a-vis the time-series income 
elasticities where the causal role of income is more direct.
In the calculations about to be presented, I calculate cross- 
sectional regressions at several different points in time. I also 
calculate cross-sectional regressions of twenty-year changes in each
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country since I do not have enough time slices to calculate true time- 
series elasticities for the individual sample nations. One caveat 
must be added: the very peculiar behavior of government expenditures 
in Romania provides an extreme point which has some influence on the 
results because the sample is small; to determine this effect, I have 
calculated the regression results both with and without this nation. 
Because the major conclusions are not changed, only the former results 
are presented.
Some demand experiments: cross sections of levels. The most 
aggregative public expenditures data are the most difficult to 
explain; for I find no very impressive statistical relationships 
between total adjusted budgetary expenditures as a share of GDP and 
such explanatory variables as per capita income and an economic 
systems dummy variable in any of the four years. Similarly 
unsuccessful results occur when total welfare state expenditures as a 
share of GNP is used as the dependent variable instead.
The situation is quite different in the case of welfare 
expenditures, where the problem is not finding explanatory variables, 
but rather separating the effects of the three most promising. One 
variable is per capita income in a common currency;’ and one would 
suspect that the higher such Income, the higher the share of welfare 
expenditures since the greater amount of discretionary income the 
society would have for such purposes. A second variable is the ratio 
of the population aged sixty-five and over to the population fifteen 
through sixty-four; and one would suspect that the higher this ratio, 
the greater the share of welfare expenditures in the economy since 
pensions constitute the greatest portion of these expenditures and the 
need for such pensions would be greatest. A third variable is a 
supply variable, namely, the length of time that the social insurance 
system had been in operation. (The operation of this variable is 
discussed below.) In addition to these three intercorrelated 
variables, I also include an economic systems variable which plays 
several roles: as a measure of market versus centrally administered 
economy; as a measure of multiparty versus single party rulership (for 
the market economies, however, Yugoslavia is similar to Eastern 
Europe); and as an additional measure of need, since the retirement 
age is lower in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. The effect of 
this need can be argued in several ways. Although the lower 
retirement age in Eastern Europe would indicate a higher ratio, the 
greater inequalities of income in the market economies (on which data 
are presented in Pryor 1973, ch. 3) would indicate a greater relative 
need for welfare payments to those in the lower part of the income 
distribution. In short, we have counteracting forces that may cancel 
each other out. Therefore, we are left with the economic system and 
the multiparty versus the single-party political systems. Evaluation 
of the impact of these phenomena on welfare expenditures raises a 
number of ideological and other issues for which no definitive answer 
can be given. Therefore, I include the variable as possibly 
Important, but without prediction about its sign. Since the results 
for all four time slices are roughly similar, in Table 5 I present 
such regressions only for 1956 and 1976.
TABLE 5
Cross-Country Experiments with Welfare Expenditures 
A. Variables:AGED “ ratio of population 65 and over to population 15 to 65. 
YCAP - logarithm of per capita GNP In a common currency.
YEARS “ years from founding of social Insurance system to 1970. 
SYS « 0 for market economy; 1 for centrally administered economy. 
WFARE » logarithm of ratio of welfare expenditures to GDP.
B. Correlation Matrices:
AGED YCAP YEARS SYS WFARE
1956 1956 1956
A®;d 1956 1.00 .53 .52 -.33 .61
YCAP 1956 1.00 .27 -.17 .35
YEARS 1.00 .03 .72
SYS 1.00 -.32
WFARE 1956 1.00
AGED YCAP YEARS SYS WFARE
1976 1976 1976
AGED 1976 1.00 .53 .65 -.18 .65
YCAP 1976 1.00 .34 -.18 .54
YEARS 1.00 .03 .47
SYS 1.00 -.47
WFARE 1976 1.00
C. Regressions (standard errors In parentheses)>;
1956
WFARE - 1.039 - 0.274 1SYS + 0.0209 YEARS r2 - .5172
(0.150) (0.0053) R^ adj. “ .4770
WFARE - 1.192 - 0.104 SYS + 0.0688 AGED R^ - .3752
(0.204) (0.0301) R^ adj. - .3231
WFARE - 1.284 - 0.216 SYS + 0.264 YCAP r2 - .1255
(0.225) (0.235) R^ adj. - .0526
1976
WFARE - 1.930 - 0.364 SYS + 0.0127 YEARS R^ - .4582
(0.166) (0.0058) R^ adj. - .3597
WFARE - 1.538 - 0.274 SYS + 0.0567 AGED R^ - .4215
(0.154) (0.0200) R^ adj. - .3733
WFARE - 0.264 - 0.292 SYS + 0.571 YCAP R^ - .4343
(0.173)I (0.282) R^ adj. ” .3414
Sources: See Tables 1, 3, 4 and footnote 3. Data on social Insurance 
systems: O.S. Dept, of Health, Educ., and Welfare (1975).
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For the two years presented In the table the results are somewhat 
different. In 1956, the number of years of operation of the social 
insurance system appears unambiguously the single most important 
explanatory variable; in 1976, the explanatory role of the percentage 
of aged, and also the per capita income, appear practically the same. 
In both years the centrally administered economies also appear to have 
lower welfare expenditures; however, with one exception these 
coefficients designating the economic system are not statistically 
significant at the .05 level. In 1976, however, statistical 
significance at a somewhat lower level of confidence is achieved and 
if the trends persist, it appears from these calculations that 
sometime in the future the share of welfare expenditures in the GNP of 
the market economies may be significantly higher than in the centrally 
administered economies. Such conclusions can also be drawn, albeit 
more tentatively, if the regressions are calculated with Romania 
omitted.
Some demand experiments: cross sections of changes. The time- 
series patterns among countries have varied considerably and it is 
useful to attempt to separate the important causal factors underlying 
this phenomenon. A simple way to approach this is by comparing 
changes between the two ends of the twenty-year period; therefore, I 
have selected as a dependent variable the percentage change of the 
ratios of various public consumption expenditures to the GDP. That 
is, if the expenditures/GDP ratio rose from .10 to .15, the dependent 
variable is the 50 percent increase in this ratio. To explain such 
changes, a number of possible explanatory variables can be selected.
An obvious candidate to explain the growth of expenditures is the 
Initial level of the variable: other things being equal, it seems 
likely that the growth of any expenditure would be inversely related 
to the Initial level of this share. Another candidate for an 
explanatory variable is per capita income: other things being equal, 
the higher this income variable, the greater the share of GNP growth 
can be considered discretionary, and the faster the growth of 
expenditures might be if it were a "luxury." A third candidate for an 
explanatory variable is the economic system, and a variety of 
ideological considerations can be imagined for its justification. A 
fourth candidate is the growth rate of GNP, and two possible 
relationships could influence the results. The faster the growth of 
GNP, the more public expenditures might lag behind what .they are 
desired to be, since other parts of the economy are growing so 
quickly; thus there might be an inverse relation between GNP growth 
and the growth of public expenditures. Further, the slower public 
expenditures grow, the more resources are available to increase growth 
in other parts of the economy so that an inverse relationship between 
GNP and public expenditures growth from this reversed causality is 
also possible. Unfortunately, the sample is too small for separating 
these effects or dealing in the most satisfactory manner with any 
possible simultaneous equations bias.
Some of the results with the highest degree of explanatory power 
are presented in Table 6. The regressions results when Romania is 
dropped from the sample are quite similar and are not included. It is 
interesting that we are able to explain time-series of the most 
aggregative public expenditures more easily than the more
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TABLE 6
Experiments with Expenditure Share Changes
A. Variables:
PTOT “ percentage change In share of total adjusted budget expen­
ditures In GDP between 1956 and 1976.
PHEW “ percentage change of share of health, education, and wel­
fare expenditures In GDP between 1956 and 1976.
PWEL • percentage change of share of welfare expenditures In GDP 
between 1956 and 1976.
SYS - 0 for market economy; 1 for centrally administered economy.
GDPGR » average annual GDP growth between 1956 and 1976.
YCAP - per capita GNP In common currency.
HEW56 - share of health, education, and welfare expenditures In 
GDP In 1956.
WEL56 = share of welfare expenditures In GDP In 1956.
B. Regressions (standard errors In parentheses):
2PTOT - 0.864 - 0.399 SYS - 0.0976 GDPGR R„ - .8414
(0.063) (0.0263) R adj. - .8126
PHEW - 2.164 - 0.324 SYS - 0.184 GDPGR - 4.852 HEW56 
(0.129) (0.057) (1.669)
R^ - .6939 
R^ adj. - .6021
PWEL - 0.821 - 0.188 SYS - 0.0606 WEL56 + 0.0106 YCAP56 
(0.167) (0.0242) (0.0051)
R^ - .5091 
R^ adj. - .3698
Sources: Data from sources cited In Tables 1, 3, 4 and footnote 3
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disaggregated series, which is exactly the reverse of the experiments 
reported in Table 5. Further, for welfare state expenditures as a 
whole, as well as for social welfare expenditures separately, the 
expected negative relationship between initial level and subsequent 
growth appeared. This, in turn, suggests that these levels of public 
expenditures are converging, at least between nations with the same 
economic system.
An extremely puzzling result occurs in the regression experiments 
for the growth of welfare expenditures, namely, that neither the share 
of aged in the population in the initial year, nor the percentage 
growth of the share of the aged, nor the growth rate in the GNP, 
seemed to influence the results in any important manner. This is 
exactly contrary to the cross section results of absolute levels where 
the percentage of aged played an apparently important causal role. I 
suspect that the discrepancies between the two sets of results 
occurred because the role of this variable, as shown in Table 5, was 
somewhat different in the two time slices. Unfortunately, we have 
insufficient data to explore this matter more deeply and, indeed, it 
may be a simple statistical artifact.
B. Supply Approaches
Supply approaches toward the explanation of determinants of 
public expenditures depend crucially on mechanisms either directly 
related to the process of producing government services (e.g., 
economies of scale) or bureaucratic processes within the government 
itself. It is useful to review rapidly some of these variables which 
have received recent attention in order to determine their 
applicability to the problem at hand.
Scale and relative productivity effects. If economies of scale 
were important in the production of public services, one would suspect 
that the share of public expenditures in the GDP would decline, 
ceteris paribus, as the GDP increased. Of course, such a scale effect 
lowers the effective price and, as a result, influences demand so that 
one must try to take account of a complicated interaction of 
variables. This does not seem to provide an interpretative problem 
for these data since few econometric studies of government 
expenditures have revealed any important scale effect.
The relative productivity effect, on the other hand, does appear 
important. The argument is quite simple: because productivity in the 
production of services generally Increases more slowly than in the 
production of goods, and because wages in the production of government 
services keep pace with the wages in other sectors of the economy, the 
relative costs of government services will rise, and we would expect a 
rise in the share of public expenditures in the GDP when both are 
defined in current prices, at least in so far as the price elasticity 
of demand for government services is not sufficiently great to cause a 
decrease in the quantity of government services demanded that totally 
offsets such a rise in relative costs.
A good deal of evidence is available to support this position. 
On a macroeconomic level, for instance, the OECD (1978) has shown that 
in constant prices, the ratio of production of government services to 
the GDP has stayed roughly constant while the current price ratio has
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risen considerably. The current price ratios have risen because of 
this price effect and also because transfers (which were not included 
in government services) rose. Further, a number of studies have 
attempted to demonstrate the extremely slow rise in productivity for 
particular governmental services, especially on the local level (e.g., 
Bradford, Malt, and Oates 1964). The role of relative productivity 
differences as a cause of the rising level of government expenditures 
to the GDP seems to be generally accepted, and to be part of the 
conventional wisdom in public finance.
However, the importance of the relative productivity effect has 
recently been challanged by Orzechowski (1974) who points out that in 
the United States the capital/labor ratio in the federal governmental 
sector (even with defense excluded) is much higher than in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. Therefore, there is no reason to 
believe that its productivity growth (at least at this level) should 
be lower than the economy as a whole. Unfortunately, since government 
output is so difficult to measure (and, indeed, is measured in the GNP 
account in terms of inputs), productivity increases may not be 
reflected in the statistics used to compute the expenditures/GDP
ratios. , r .i, •Since I have measured the government services in terms of their 
inputs in the sample nations, the relative productivity effect 
certainly may play a role in the rise of the expenditures/GDP ratio. 
However, it is not by any means the only cause of all the rise, for, 
as shown in Table 4, such expenditures as welfare, which consist 
mostly of transfers, have risen very fast as well- Unfortunately, I 
have no way of measuring this relative productivity effect -- and 
neither does anyone else examining the problem on a macroeconomic 
level.
The displacement effect. In a well-known book, Alan Peacock and 
Jack Wiseman (1961) proposed that the pattern of government 
expenditures over time reveals a ratchet effect. Due to the 
difficulties of the political authorities in raising tax rates, 
government expenditures as a ratio of GNP move along some slowly 
changing trend line until the occurrence of a war or other national 
emergency. At this point, it is politically feasible to raise tax 
rates and, after the end of the national emergency, they may be 
lowered, but never to the previous level. In short, the national 
emergency provides a displacement of the trend. Such an argument is a 
particularization of a common hypothesis among historians that 
economic crises lead to a strengthening of pvernment as groups 
attempt to utilize the government to resolve their problems.
This rather superficial theory has received considerable comment 
in the literature. Most attempts to test it statistically using time- 
series data from various nations have generally revealed the 
displacement to be small or negligible in most cases. More important 
to our purposes, this theory does not explain the dramatic increase in 
public expenditures as a ratio of GNP in the West during the last two 
decades, for most countries have not experienced war. Although to 
save the theory we might define this period as a national emergency, 
such a step changes the theory into a tautology, which was certainly 
not the intention of its proponents.
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A government employee voting mechanism. A number of economists 
(especially the authors of the essays in Borcherding 1977) have 
suggested that the presence of government workers in a democracy adds 
an impetus to the growth of governmental expenditures, for it is in 
their career interests to vote for candidates favoring larger budgets. 
Since empirical evidence has shown that governmental employees have a 
much higher participation in voting than the average voter, these 
workers may constitute a swing vote that brings about an upward spiral 
of government expenditures.
As economists such as Courant (1979), Greene and Munley (1979), 
and Pommerehne and Frey (1978) have pointed out, this approach has 
some theoretical difficulties which reduce its credibility. It would 
not be surprising that empirical tests of the hypothesis on local 
governmental votes have not been able to validate it. This approach 
also does not seem promising to explain trends in public expenditures 
in East and West.
A monopoly mechanism. Drawing upon the work of William Niskanen 
(1971), some economists (e.g., Orzechowski 1977) have pointed toward 
the following constellation of factors as underlying the growth of 
government expenditures. First, government bureaucrats try to 
maximize their budgets, for this allows them to increase their 
personal power over resources. Second, the output of government is 
hard to measure, as is the efficiency of the offices performing this 
work. Third, politicians in the legislature have neither the time nor 
the expertise to check thoroughly the budgets of these agencies to 
determine carefully what they are producing and how productive their 
work is. Thus, the government bureaus stand in a monopoly position 
vis-a-vis the politicians and, therefore, government expenditures tend 
to increase.
It can be argued that politicians have an incentive to be elected 
and since high taxes are painful to pay, they have an incentive to 
keep the expenditures of the government at a low level so as to 
maximize their votes. This would invalidate the third argument. 
Further, the conclusion does not follow from the assumptions. That 
is, although the government,bureaus may stand as monopolists vis-a-vis 
the legislature, this means only that their budgets are somewhat 
higher than they ordinarily would be, and that they may be 
inefficient, not that the ratio of these budgetary expenditures to the 
GNP is constantly rising.
Another problem with this type of approach is that a static 
argument is being extended illegitimately to a dynamic situation. 
That is, the argument was originally propounded in terms of a cross- 
sectional comparison. Even if we assume that it is correct, it does 
not imply that the share of public expenditures will increase over 
time, something that Niskanen (1975) has pointed out.
A variant of this argument is one of the humorous laws propounded 
by G. Northcote Parkinson, who suggested that it is the essence of 
bureaucracy to increase its expenditures, even when the tasks it 
performs may be decreasing. There is, of course, considerable 
anecdotal evidence for this position. And as I have pointed out in a 
previous section, the ratio of such expenditures to the GNP depends in 
part on how long the social insurance system has been in operation: 
the longer the time period, the higher the ratio of public
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expenditures. This is because such programs increase in the share of 
the population served, in the extent of their programs, and in the 
magnitude of the payments. The crucial question, however, is whether 
these changes represented a demand or a supply phenomenon.
The question becomes more pointed when examining the results of a 
quantitative study of public expenditures by the OECD for their member 
Ltions for a period from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. The 
results (OECD 1978, 26) showed that for the total growth of social 
welfare expenditures, 16 percent was due to demographic changes (e.g., 
a larger number of the elderly receiving social insurance), 44 percent 
was due to eligibility changes, 24 percent to increased per capita 
payments and changes in the relative size of real benefits, and 16 
percent to changes in costs. Clearly the impact of demographic 
factors can not be attributed to supply factors. Are the changes in 
elieibility, per capita payments, and real benefits a result o 
bureaucratic forces? Or did these changes truly reflect the demands 
of the voters? Unfortunately, no statistical analysis separating such 
factors has yet been made for this case.
Other supply effects. A number of analysts have pointed toward 
other supply effects. For instance, in city expenditures, the 
presence of a city manager versus a mayoral form of government seems 
to make a difference. Or the presence of grants from a central 
government to local governments may increase local governmental 
expenditures. Or the presence of competiton between local gover^ents 
for enticing industry to their regions may act to lower expenditures, 
at least in so far as low tax rates are offered to potential 
investors. No believable evidence has yet been presented that such 
supply effects would make much difference on the national level on 
which we are focusing. Other types of supply effects, for example, 
the impact of public spending limits, appear to have more effect 
(Pascal 1979) but the evidence on these matters is relatively limited.
The occurrence of some special supply effects for Eastern Europe 
must also be noted. For the Soviet Union, Gur Ofer (1973) has shown 
that the analysis of the service sector (including the government 
sector) must take into account the presence of less-trained workers 
(particularly women) than in other sectors, the underpricing of 
defense goods (which is made up to the producers by subsidies that are 
not included in these calculations), the underpricing of -"edical 
services (because of the relatively low salaries of doctors), and t 
constant campaigns to cut down "unproductive labor. Obviously, some 
of these factors are offsetting so that their net effects are much 
smaller than their separate gross effects. Moreover some appe« to 
apply more to the Soviet Union than to some of the other Eastern 
European nations (e.g., in the DDR, the salaries of doctors are
’"^^^^T^o^ob"s«Vations about such supply factors special to Eastern 
Europe must be made. First, in most cases, they introduce
quantitative effects that are strictly of secondary importance. 
Second, they probably affect cross-sectional analyses more than time- 
series analyses since there is little reason to believe that such 
effects are growing or declining in importance.
381
C. A Combined Approach
The combined supply and demand approaches that have been proposed 
usually focus upon the mechanisms by which the demand for public 
expenditures is related to the financing of such expenditures. 
Perhaps the earliest exponent of such an approach was Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1835) who considered the relative public expenditures in 
three communities whose legislatures were dominated, respectively, by 
the richest class, by the middle class, and by the most numerous and 
poorest class.
De Tocqueville argued that public expenditures would be lowest 
when the middle class had legislative power, for this class would be 
loath to tax itself: "Nothing is so onerous as a large impost levied 
upon a small income. The government of the middle classes appears to 
me the most economical, I will not say the most enlightened, and 
certainly not the most generous, of free governments." When universal 
suffrage occurs, the poor are invested with the government of 
authority. And in this case, "[public] expenditures will always be 
considerable, either because the taxes cannot weigh upon those who 
levy them, or because they are levied in a manner as not to reach 
these poorer classes."
This kind of approach has been embodied in analyses of the growth 
of public expenditures in several different ways. Sometimes it is 
generalized in a manner that focuses upon the relative strength of the 
beneficiaries of public expenditures compared with those who pay the 
taxes to finance them. For instance, Meltzer (1976) argues that 
public expenditures rise because the beneficiaries are more organized 
and have more to gain by public expenditures benefiting them alone 
than any single individual outside the group loses. Thus, the latter 
have less incentive to organize around the issue than the former. 
Such an argument has a great deal of intuitive appeal, but it is 
difficult to see exactly how it could be empirically tested.
Peltzman (1980) has recast de Tocqueville's approach in an 
elegant model. (He reaches farther back in history and designates the 
poor taking from (taxing) the rich as the "Robin Hood effect.") He 
mathematically derives three propositions for a democracy with 
universal sufferage. 1. The wider the range of income between the 
rich and the poor, the higher the taxes on the rich and public 
expenditures will be. 2. The narrower the range of income among the 
lower-income classes, the higher the taxes on the rich and. thus the 
public expenditures will be. 3. The more educated the lower-income 
classes, and the more able they are to understand and operate the 
political process, the higher the taxes on the rich and public 
expenditures will be.**
But what does this tell us about nations whose public 
expenditures are not decided through a legislature whose members are 
elected through universal sufferage? Certainly some nondemocratic 
societies (e.g., Japan before the Meiji restoration) had considerable 
public expenditures. However, this arose because the rich controlled 
the state and used the state to benefit themselves by taxing the poor. 
Other precapitalist societies without universal suffrage appear to 
have had a relatively low level of public expenditures.
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What does such an approach tell us about the differences between 
public expenditures in East and West? Assuming away, for the moment, 
differences in the political structure, no firm conclusions can be 
drawn. Certainly the income distribution per se should play no 
important role, for in Eastern Europe the income differences within 
the lower half of the income distribution, and between the lower and 
the upper halves of the income distribution, seem more equal than in 
the West (Pryor 1973) and, according to Peltzman, these two effects 
work in opposite directions on public expenditures. Further, the 
educational levels are not very different between the two sets of 
countries.
Of course, in the nations of Eastern Europe the legislature plays 
a very minor role in the setting of the governmental budgets and, 
further, competition between political parties for votes does not 
occur. From this, Peltzman's argument suggests that welfare state 
expenditures would be greater in the West during the entire period. 
However, we only find this phenomenon appearing in the 1970s; before 
this, such expenditures were roughly the same. Further, Peltzman s 
approach does not give us any clues as to why public expenditures in 
the East started to rise in the 1970s.
Trying to combine the supply and demand approaches toward public 
expenditures gives us very few theoretical guideposts to tell us 
whether such expenditures will be higher in the East or West. The 
only relevant data presented in this essay that concerns this issue 
are the series on welfare, where it seems likely that there is a 
redistribution of income between the rich and poor. Although it 
appears from the regression experiments in Tables 5 and 6 that such 
welfare expenditures are relatively lower and are increasing less 
quickly in Eastern than in Western Europe, the sample is small and we 
can not be completely sure on this. Further, the experiment is not 
completely "clean" because the really important redistributional 
element in such welfare expenditures is from the middle aged to the 
old.
IV. SOME REFLECTIONS
A number of questions have been raised in this essay. To explore 
them empirically, it would be useful to employ a complicated 
multiequation model that can bring in many of the factors discussed. 
But the data do not permit us this luxury.
Although firm analytical conclusions can not be drawn, it appears 
that demand elements play the most important role in the increase in 
public expenditures in both East and West. With the exception of a 
variable indicating length of existence of the social insurance 
system, no supply variables appeared important in the regression 
analyses. Even the"relative productivity effect" does not seem very 
important, at least in the recent past.
The role of the systems variable is complicated. It does not 
appear significant in the cross-sectional regressions of expenditure 
levels except, perhaps, at the most disaggregated level for welfare 
expenditures where the centrally administered economies have a lower 
share of such expenditures in their GDP. However, in the cross- 
sectional regressions of changes in expenditures over time, it appears 
that for expenditures defined in the most aggregated manner, such
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total public consumption expenditures increased more slowly as a share 
of GDP in the centrally administered economies than in the market 
economies. However, on a disaggregated level this does not appear to 
be the case for certain types of expenditures such as for welfare. 
Together, such results suggest that in the future, for all levels of 
expenditures, the centrally administered economies will have a lower 
share of adjusted budgetary expenditures.
Certain empirical questions are even more difficult to answer. 
For instance, when will the share of public expenditures in the GDP 
stop rising, a pressing question that has been discussed both on the 
political level in various electoral campaigns throughout the world, 
as well as on a theoretical level (see, for example, the views of 
economists in a large number of nations in Recktenwald 1978). To help 
us answer this question, several conflicting factors need to be taken 
into account.
Fitst, for the fastest growing components of adjusted budgetary 
expenditures, namely, health, education, and welfare (and for social 
welfare alone), the rapidity of growth is Inversely proportional to 
the share of these expenditures in the initial period (Table 6). This 
suggests a slowing down of growth in the future.
Second, although many of the demand influences underlying past 
increases of public expenditures show no signs of abating, we can not 
be completely sure that these will continue to play an Important 
causal role in the rise in the share of public expenditures. For 
instance, the aged continue to increase as a share of the population 
and, therefore, one part of social insurance expenditures might appear 
to continue to rise. The aged also have greater health needs and, 
therefore, another part of social insurance expenditures might rise. 
However, the change in the share of the aged did not appear to 
influence the change in expenditures directed to them, at least in the 
twenty year time period under examination.
Third, the demand forces for other types of public expenditures, 
for example, for education, may increase at a very slow rate or cease 
entirely. For education, however, offsetting factors influencing 
public expenditures can be cited; the lower birth rates and a falling 
share of children in the population make for a decline in the relative 
share of education; but the increasing complexity of society requires 
increased education expenditures. For some expenditures it is 
difficult to say how the major causal elements will change. For 
instance, for defense expenditures, it is clear that the rising 
international tensions in the short run will not abate; in the long 
run, however, the situation may be different, and nations may become 
more civilized to their neighbors so the need for such expenditures 
may decrease.
Fourth, many of the existing governmental programs in most 
developed countries in the West have considerable room for an 
expansion of the eligibility requirements (OECD 1978, 30-38). The 
political ability to resist these increases depends crucially on 
changes in the strength of these governments, and these are difficult 
to predict. It should be noted that effective national movements to 
bring about the limitation of government taxation or expenditures (as 
manifested through such activities as parliamentary action to limit 
taxes, tax evasion, and reduced work effort) seem far in the future 
for many countries.
384
The share of public consumption expenditures in the GDP has been 
rising in most nations in East and West and, at least in the near 
future, should continue along this path. Predicting the long-term 
future of this share is dangerous since the relative strengths of 
various offsetting factors can not be determined. If pressed, I would 
bet that a leveling off will occur in the next decade. However, I 
would not lay much money on such a bet.
FOOTNOTES
For assistance in obtaining data I would like to thank Thad 
Alton, Noel Farley, Helen Hughes, Peter Miovic, and the various 
national statistical agencies that sent me published and unpublished 
data. I would also like to thank David Muething, Gur Ofer, and Larry 
Seidman for their comments on a previous draft of this paper.
1. The U.S. national accounts data do not include expenditures for
construction and equipment by various levels of government in the 
investment data. These latter expenditures (taken from U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1978, 288) were added to the national
accounts data to obtain total investment. Data on federal
government loans and guarantees comes from Murray L. Weidenbaum 
(1977).
2. The major corrections for 1962 occurred not in the public 
expenditures data, but rather in the GNP data for several Eastern 
European nations. The public expenditures estimations for 1970 
and 1977 were too tedious to be reported here. A desription of 
the methods can be obtained from the author.
3. The per capita GNPs in a common currency for 1970 are reported in
Table 1. To calculate such data for other years, the following 
sources were used for the market economies: OECD 1979; I.B.R.D. 
1975; I.B.R.D. (forthcoming). For the centrally administered 
economies the following sources were utilized: Alton 1977; Alton
1970; Bloch 1979; Greenslade 1976.
4. To demonstrate his theory empirically, Peltzman (1980) used four 
sets of data: long-time-series data for the U.S.A., the U.K., and 
Japan; cross-sectional OECD data; data on state and local 
expenditures in the various U.S. states in different years; and 
some cross-sectional data for various developing nations. 
However, such analyses can be criticized on several grounds. 
First, he used total government expenditures, rather than 
expenditures related to redistribution as his theory specified. 
Second, since a narrowing of income differences between the 
richest and the poorest, and within the poorest, groups appears 
highly correlated, and since these differences lead to opposite 
changes in public expenditures, they must be separated. However, 
only for the data concerning the U.S. states did this appear 
possible. Third, the results for the U.S. states did not validate
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his theory until a cross-product term involving education was 
added. However, there appeared to be multicollinearity between 
this terra and the other independent variables so that the results 
can be questioned. Finally, it is possible that his results were 
due to the causal arrows running in the opposite direction. For 
instance, a raore progressive tax may lead to less investment in 
human and physical capital which will, in turn, reduce the labor 
supply for high-lncpme occupations. This will later raise the 
wages in these groups which, in turn, will lead to a greater gap 
between the rich and poor. Thus a greater differentiation between 
rich and poor is associated with a more progressive Income tax, 
but the tax causes the differentiation. Another Instance would 
occur where higher social insurance payouts lead to less labor 
being offered by older workers which, in turn, means that their 
monetary income is lower (but they work less) and there is a 
greater gap between older and poorer workers on one hand, and 
richer people on the other. Thus a greater differentiation of 
income between rich and poor is associated with a greater social 
security payout, but the latter brought about the former.
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